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1 Introduction
Current military and intelligence operations utilize a variety of specialized (often called “stove-
piped”) systems to provide I/O and computing.  Access to and controlled sharing of information
from various networks operating at different classifications (e.g., NIPRNET, SIPRNET, JWICS,
and COWANS) is difficult in ad hoc operational networks.  To address the exchange of
information in command and control and intelligence systems in the emerging Global
Information Grid (GIG), such as the Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS),
requires support for high assurance authentication and multilevel capabilities.
These requirements provide the impetus for the creation of two complementary research efforts:
the Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) project and the Trusted Computing Exemplar
(TCX) project.  The objective of the MYSEA project is to explore and develop a high assurance
heterogeneous distributed operating environment that is capable of enforcing multilevel security
policies while maintaining support for existing applications and unmodified commodity client
systems [1].   The purpose of the TCX project is to provide an openly distributed worked
example of how high assurance trusted components could be constructed [2].  The TCX
reference implementation, i.e., the TCX Separation Kernel, will be developed in accordance with
the Common Criteria evaluation methodology [3] and will be used as the underlying trusted
foundation for two MYSEA trusted components, the Trusted Path Extension (TPE) and Trusted
Channel Module (TCM).
Synergistically, the purpose of the Multilevel Security (MLS) Testbed project is to create a stable
testing environment for experimentation in high assurance security services being developed in
the MYSEA and TCX projects.  These include assured authentication and trusted path access to
security critical functions, MLS services and secure single level connections to existing
classified networks.
The MLS Testbed project is an on-going effort supported by multiple sponsors.  This document
describes the progress made in FY2004 that includes the construction of the MLS Testbed and
the functional testing of the security services currently supported by the MYSEA server.
2 Technical Overview
The project mission is to create an evolving testbed for a distributed multilevel secure
architecture such as MYSEA that combines protection against cyber attacks with a hardened
foundation for coalition operations.  The goal is to demonstrate how U.S. participants can use a
single workstation for multilevel access to U.S. and coalition WANS at different classification
levels.  Leveraging previous MYSEA R&D results, demonstration scenarios running on the MLS
Testbed show that it is feasible to afford popular desktop applications, e.g. the Microsoft Office
suite, to clients in a MLS/Multiple Security Level (MSL) environment and to provide operators
within a community of interest network (COIN) with web-based views of multilevel information.
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2.1 Project Background and Benefits
2.1.1 Background
As the intelligence community and military make advances toward new information
architectures intended to provide connectivity and information sharing on an unprecedented
scale, a number of challenges must be addressed.  Today, Internet users are plagued by daily
barrages of spam in their e-mail boxes, while the Internet as a whole is disrupted by rapidly
propagating, automated attacks that exploit system vulnerabilities. A perceived requirement for
use of commodity software familiar to home users, but lacking the robustness and security
protections required for industrial-grade critical missions has further exacerbated weaknesses in
the information infrastructure.  Without improved security measures in tandem with improved
bandwidth, the realization of useable and defensible information infrastructures may be only a
chimera.
Among the most important of the security mechanisms required for the shared vision is strong
and secure authentication. The unspoofable binding between users and the system entities that
act on their behalf must be established through mechanisms by which users have a positive
connection to trusted elements in the system supporting security critical activities. The
trustworthy connection presented by the system is known as the trusted path: it provides
confidence that neither the system nor the user is being spoofed. Such a high confidence trusted
path is needed for networks intended to achieve the highest evaluation classes under current
criteria guidance.  Trusted path mechanisms will provide enabling technology for Navy
operations requiring information classified at different sensitivity levels and involving coalition
forces.
2.1.2 Benefits
The MLS Testbed provides an evolving simulated distributed MLS environment that will permit
experimentation in the following research areas:
• Secure connections to classified networks
• Secure reuse of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and legacy hardware and software
components
• Application of high assurance security technology to legacy components
• Interoperability with the DoD PKI infrastructure
• Centralized security management within the context of a distributed environment
• Secure integration of multilevel security with existing sensitive networks
• High assurance trusted path techniques for managing access to classified networks
• Flexibility to incorporate new technologies
The notion that clients can be heterogeneous will support efforts involving a variety of partners,
which in turns will promote MLS awareness in the commercial sector.
2.2 MLS Testbed Design Overview
The 2005 Testbed design is shown in Figure 1.  Using mostly COTS components, the Testbed
provides a demonstration environment for the following functionalities:
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• True multilevel access to data at multiple levels of security using a single commercial
workstation
• Single-level-at-a-time access to sensitive single level networks (i.e., simulated
NIPERNET and SIPERNET) using a single commercial workstation
• Access to heterogeneous operating systems, hardware components and applications
• Use of a high assurance server as locus of high assurance security policy enforcement
• Use of hand held appliances for trusted path
• Controlled interaction of disparate coalitions and enclaves
Figure 1.  2005 MLS Testbed Design
Although Figure 1 shows one MLS server, the MYSEA design supports the use of a federation
of MLS servers to provide better performance, scalability and reliability.  The MYSEA server
enforces a unified mandatory access control security policy based on the Bell-LaPadula [4]
confidential policy and the strict Biba [5] integrity policy.  The Trusted Path Extension (TPE)
device is a trusted component responsible for providing a secure interface for user interaction
with selected MYSEA Server security functions.  After a successful login and session level
negotiation via the trusted path, an MLS LAN user can access any data at the MYSEA server
that is allowed by the security policy.  The current MYSEA security policy allows reading
information that is at the same or lower in sensitivity than the negotiated session level.  All
information written will be labeled at the negotiated session level.
Similarly, the Trusted Channel Module (TCM) device is a trusted component responsible for
providing secure identification of single level networks connected to the MYSEA server.   When
accessing the MYSEA server via the TCM, users on a single level network can only access data
on the MYSEA server at the classification level assigned to the corresponding TCM.
The Tarantella/enView server is used to provide to MLS LAN clients, via an integrated portal
view, web-based access to applications that run on different server platforms (Windows, Unix,
Linux).  This will allow the use of standard web browsers to access proprietary applications on
the simulated legacy networks, e.g., Word or PowerPoint.   The inclusion of web-enabling
technology is part of the MYSEA’s thin-client migration strategy.
The Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC) system, a battlefield situational
awareness tool, is used in the Testbed to demonstrate the ability to support legacy mission-
critical applications.  The C2PC REPEAT track simulator acts as a Global Command and
Control System (GCCS) server that, in a real operational environment, would feed tactical
information to the C2PC Gateway and C2PC Clients.  The C2PC Gateway is the conduit
between the GCCS server (i.e., REPEAT track simulator) and the C2PC Clients.  It provides
tactical track data received from the GCCS server to the C2PC Clients and forwards track
updates from the C2PC Clients to the GCCS server.  In the demonstration, the C2PC Client is a
Windows application hosted on an MLS LAN client workstation, which displays the tactical map
window.
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Both military-grade Type 1 encryption devices and commercial VPN appliances are used in the
Testbed to simulate the protected end-to-end communication between the MLS controlled
environment and remote single level networks.
3 MLS Testbed
3.1 Network Topology
In 2004, the CISR team constructed the MLS testbed as shown in Figure 2.  The current testbed
differs in several ways from the 2005 Testbed design discussed in Figure 1.  Since the
development of the Trusted Channel Module (TCM) component is not yet completed, the
SECRET and COALTION segments are separately connected to the MYSEA server via two
single level network interfaces instead of being multiplexed onto one MLS interface.
Another difference is the configuration of the C2PC system.  Enhancements to the MYSEA
server to support C2PC proxy services are required in order to implement the C2PC
configuration depicted in Figure 1, i.e., C2PC Client application running locally on an MLS
LAN workstation.  Since these enhancements are not yet available, the C2PC Client application
is hosted on a remote server and accessed by the MLS LAN client via Tarantella/enView.
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Figure 2.  Current MLS Testbed Design
3.2 Hardware Components
The Testbed consists of 35 machines, categorized as follows:
Special Purpose Equipment:
• MLS server:  1 (DigitalNet XTS-400)
• Handheld TPE devices:  2  (iPAQ Pocket PC)
Commercial-Of-The-Shelf Equipment:
• Servers:  14  (9 rack-mounted platforms, 5 desktops)
• Laptop clients:  5
• VPN appliances:  4
• Network switches:  5
Government Furnished Equipment:
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• TACLANE (Type 1 encryptor) devices:  4
Hardware Acceptance Test Procedures were established and used to verify that each hardware
element worked properly before being used in the actual Testbed.
3.3 Software Components
The following set of software from different vendors is used in the Testbed to simulate a
heterogeneous operating environment.
• Trusted Operating System:  DigitalNet Secure Trusted Operating System (STOP).  The
XTS-400 running STOP was evaluated at the Common Criteria EAL-4+ level and is
currently being evaluated at the EAL-5+ level [6].
• Operating Systems:  RedHat Linux, Microsoft Windows 2000 server, Microsoft Windows
XP and Familiar Project Linux
• MLS Application (running on the MYSEA server):  Apache-like web server
Linux Applications:  PostgreSQL, Apache web server, Edge Technologies enPortal,
Tarantella Enterprise 3, imapd and sendmail
• Windows Applications:  Microsoft Terminal Services, Microsoft Office, Microsoft
Project, Internet Explorer, C2PC Gateway, C2PC Client, REPEAT 2004–RepeatWinXR
and Creative WebCam PROeX




The MYSEA server in the testbed is currently configured to run an Apache-like web server.
After a successful login to the MYSEA at an authorized session level via the TPE, a user on the
MLS LAN can view web pages at the same or lower sensitivity level.  Multilevel email will be
available in the near future.
4.2 MSL Services
The following COTS applications have been tested and are being used in the Testbed via the
Tarantella/enView integrated portal interface:
• Microsoft Office (Word, PowerPoint, Excel, Access)
• Microsoft Project
• Microsoft Outlook Express
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• Creative PC-Cam Center (running as a standalone client application)
4.3 Transmission Security Services
Two pairs of high assurance TACLANE network encryptors are used to simulate the encrypted
channels required to protect data transmissions between networks that are geographically
separated, i.e., between the MYSEA controlled environment and the SIPRNET and COIN
segments.   The TACLANE devices are keyed with dummy test keys and are physically
protected while not in use.
For day-to-day testing, two pairs of Cisco IPsec VPN devices are used in place of the
TACLANE devices.  The IPsec attributes used to set up the VPN channels are as follows:
• Hash algorithm:  HMAC-SHA1
• Encryption algorithm:  3DES-CBC
• Host authentication method (for Security Association establishment):  pre-shared secret
• Security protocol:  IP Authentication Header (AH) and IP Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) with ESP authentication
• Mode of operation: tunnel mode
• Key management:  automated using IKE
5 Future Plans
In the next year we expect to incorporate into the Testbed new MYSEA features as well as the
following MYSEA functionalities that are currently under development:
• MLS services:  IMAP and SMTP applications, NFS and SAMBA support
• “Stateless” MLS LAN clients running embedded XP
• Support for running remote client applications on the MYSEA server
• Proof-of-concept TCM prototype
• TPE hardware migration to newest iPAQ model
In addition to accommodating new MYSEA and TCX technologies and requirements, we will
explore the integration of the MLS Testbed into the GIG architecture.  We also plan to conduct
performance analyses of the Testbed.
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